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it is not for me to speculate; but I may express my 
humble opinion that our intervention in the 'var upon 
the invasion of Belgium in defense of treaty obligations, 
against the breach of such obligations by the invaders, 
'vas a complete surprise even to their Government. 
Documents and facts 'vhich throw light upon the 
history of the days I have been dealing 'vith between 
July 24 and August 4, 1914, are, I think, admirably 
collected and stated in a -vvork called the liistory of 
T\velve Days, by Mr. J. W. Headlam. 
On the grounds that the German vendors had no 
thought of the imminence of war between Germany and 
this country, and did not have such a war in contempla-
tion at any time while the transactions of sale were taking 
place or before they were completed, I hold that the 
sales to the t'vo Dutch merchants were valid, and that 
the goods were not confiscable. And I decree the release 
to then1 respectively of the net proceeds of the sale of 
their respective goods, 'vhich are now in court. 
THE " GLITRA." 
July 30, 1915. 
1 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts, 34. 
In the prize matter concerning the English steamer 
Glitra, with Leith as her home port, the imperial superior 
prize court in Berlin, at its sitting of July 30, 1916, has 
found as follows: 
The appeals lodged by the plaintiffs under Nos. 9 to 12 of the decision 
are rejected as inadmissible; the appeals of the remaining plaintiffs 
are denied as unfounded. 
The costs of the proceedings in appeal are to be borne by the plaintiffs. 
REASONS. 
Statement of On October 20, 1914, the steamer Glitra, belonging to 
thecase. the firm of Salversent & Co., of Leith, with a general 
cargo on the vvay from Leith to Stavanger, was brought 
to by a submarine, and after the cre'v had left the ship 
she "\Vas sunk, together with her cargo. 
re~~~ti~~s. prize In answer to the summons of the prize court issued in 
accordance 'vith section 26 of the prize court regulations, 
the 13 parties interested in the cargo submitted claims 
for compensation for damages due to the destruction of 
their merchandise. The plaintiffs are members of Nor-
'vegian firms; the plain tiff figuring in claim No. 2 alone . 
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is a Danish insurance company 'vhich presents the claims 
of its Norwegian policyholders. 
The prize court has found that the ship which 'vas 
sunk was subject to seizure and has denied the clahn. 
The appeal lodged against this decision is not 'vell 
founded. 
The prize court has in the first place impartially Destruction 
· ' ' necessary. 
established that the Glitra was an English ship, and that, 
given the circun1stances of the case, the destruction of the 
ship was necessary, in order to insure the capture. The 
prize court did not concern itself ~with the question as to 
whether or not the merchandise, on account of which 
claims for compensation 'vere submitted, "\Vas neutral 
merchandise, because it came to the conclusion that even 
if such had been the case there would be no cause for a 
claim to compensation for damages. In justification of 
this conclusion it was stated that the question thus brought 
up had not been decided either in the prize regulations or 
in any international treaties, and, especially, it had not 
been decided in the London declaration, as is evidenced L~~~~ation or 
by its text and the history of its origin. It was said 
that opinion had been divided. It was stated that by 
the French memoir neutral cargoes were not entitled to 
claims for damages, because, "\Vhen the captor, for military -
reasons, holds the destruction of the prize to be necessary, 
such a situation presents a military· measure; while, on 
the other hand, the English memoir adn1its the claim, 
provided the case does not involve contraband, because 
a permissible cargo on board an ene1ny ship is not subject 
to seizure. The question forn1ulated as a guide for the 
preliminary discussion: 
In view of the principle that neutral merchandise :eg~ral 
under enemy flag is not subject to seizure, "\Vill the owner c an Ise. 
of the merchandise, in case of the destruction of the ship, 
have to be indemnified, or is, in such case, the destruction 
of a ship a military action "\vhich does not obligate the 
belligerent to make indemnification~ 
had been discussed without bringing about an under-
standing. The prize court observed that during these 
negotiations the question mainly dealt \Vith 'vas the 
admissibility of the destruction of neutral ships, subject 
to seizure. Confining herself to this particular matter, 
Germany had expressed herself in favor of compensation 
for neutral goods not subject to seizure. Japan alone had 
declared herself \vith regard to the matter of neutral mer-
mer-
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chandise on an enemy ship which \Vas destroyed, and that 
uJ~dem:nifica in the sense of England. Nothing indicated that, as 
matters stood, Germany had meant to establish in the 
prize regulations a principle to the effect that when an 
enemy shizJ was destroyed, the neutral cargo \Vas entitled 
to a claim for indemnification. In this sense at most an 
argument could be deduced from article 114 of the prize 
regulations, in so far as it \Vas here presupposed that in 
destroying any ship compensation must be made for the 
incidental destruction of that part of the cargo not sub-
ject to seizure. The argument was considered, ho\vever, 
not sufficiently conclusive. It might readily be as~umed 
that article 114 referred only to the destruction of neutral 
ships, in view of the fact that the preceding and the fol-
lo,ving provision of the prize regulations dealt only with 
such case. 
'fhis vic"\v must, in effect, be approved. 
Ger~an~ prize The c1uestion to be settled is as to whether or not in 
regulatiOns. 
case an enemy ship is lawfully destroyed, compens3,tion 
must be made for neutrt"tl merchandise on board such 
ship which is destroyed at the same time. It is clear 
that neither the prize regulations nor the London 
declaration, contains an express prescription in regard 
· to this matter. Nor has the prize regulation indi-
rectly provided for the settlement of that matter. The 
plaintiff believes that such a provision is found in No. 
114 of the prize regulations. The judge of first instance 
has justly denied this, although \Ve ca.n not absolutely 
agree with him in all the reasons he gives anent this 
matter. In the article referred to the commander is 
directed, before proceeding with the destruction of a ship, 
to see if the loss thereby accruing to the enemy is equiva-
lent to the compensation for damages "\vhich must be 
paid for that part of the cargo not subject to seizure 
\vhich is destroyed at the same time. 
Destruction. In connection with this~ reference is made, between 
brackets, among other things to article 18 which deals 
with the seizure of enemy ships and states \vhich part of 
the cargo is, at the same time, subject to seizure. This 
in effect, looks as though the author of the prize regula-
tions had, when dealing with article 114, thought that 
in the case of the destruction of an enemy ship compensa-
tion must be made for the part of the cargo not subject 
to seizure; it rnust also be admitted that the said refer-
ence is opposed to the course of reasoning follo,ved by 
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the first instance \vhen it assumes that article 114, even 
as the preceding and the follo\ving provision, dealt only 
with the destruction of neutral ships. In spite of that, 
ho\vever, the provision can not be given such scope of in-
terpretation as that with which the plaintiffs meant to 
endow it. If it 'Nere so understood, it \vould come into a 
certain material contradiction with that \Vhich the prize 
regulation prescribes in the immediately connecting arti-
cle. ...~s can be clearly seen from this, the prize regula-
tion does not hold that, in every case compensation must 
be made for the destruction of merchandise not subject to 
seizure. In the case of the lavvful destruction of a neu-
tral ship, compensation is prescribed for the merchandise, 
not subject to seizure, destroyed along with the ship, in 
so far as this concerns neutral merchandise, but not in re-
gard to enemy merchandise, although likewise not subject 
~ to seizure, under the protection of the neutral flag. We 
must, furthermore, bear in mind that there are also enemy 
ships that are not subject to seizure, and, therefore, not 
subject to destruction, so that, even although at some 
time-· possibly by reason of a pardonable error-the de-
struction took place, it may yet be asked, \Vhether or not a 
distinction should be dra\vn in regard to compensation 
for values destroyed along \vith the ship, between neutral 
and enemy merchandise, and for this reason it might 
have seemed advisable to direct the comm.anders of 
vessels, for such eventualities, to make the inquiry in-
cumbent upon them according to article 114. But it is 
above all important to remember that article 114 is not 
sedes rnateriae and that, therefore, even assuming that 
the author of the law thought that even in case of the 
lawful destruction of an enemy ship claims for compensa-
tion could be pres en ted in behalf of the merchandise of 
neutrals, it would be wrong to find therein a positive 
decision of this at least doubtful, and at all events very 
controverted question which, Rlthough discussed at the 
London Conference, was left open. 
As Wehberg points out in Oesterreich. Zeitschrift fur 
offentliches Recht, Tome II, 3, page 282, I-Ieilfron, Jur. 
Wochenschrift, 1915, page 486, goes too far Vv~hen he 
attributes to the prize regulations only the importance 
of an order promulgated by the Emperor to the naval 
authorities. The prize regulations contain, to a large 
extent, positive law. But, 'vith regard to the provision 
now under consideration, Heilfron's characterization fits 
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perfectly. This article 114 is, in effect, but an order to 
the con1manders of ships. Through it only the war lord 
speaks, and not the legislator. It is not its purpose to 
establish material right and it does not do so. 
Law or warfare. If, therefore, 've are compelled to consider the most 
Damages. 
general principles of law in connection 'vith the rules of 
the general law of warfare, it is found 'vith absolute cer-
tainty that neutrals are not entitled to present a claim 
in case the destruction of the prize 'vas, in the circum-
stances, justified (art. 112 of the prize regulations). The 
bringing to and the capture of the enemy ship is a 
lawful war 1neasure against the foreign State, approved 
in internationalla,v-. Claims for damages, either on the 
part of the nationals of enemy States or on the part of 
neutrals can not in all such cases be upheld. To be sure, 
according to article 3 of the Paris declaration, neutral 
1nerchandise (that is not contraband) is not subject to • 
capture even on board an enemy ship. It is, therefore, 
not subject to seizure in case the prize is taken to port. 
But there is no suggestion that the parties interested in 
the cargo are entitled to present claims for compensation 
for damages that have arisen as a result of the ship being 
taken to port, of an interruption in the trip or the taking 
of the ship to another than the point of destination. Nor 
is it legitimate to present a claim for co1npensation in 
case the merchandise itself, as a result of the seizure of 
the ship, has sustained damage, nor, for instance, if on 
the further journey of the prize it is lost as a result of 
an accident at sea. Since the seizure is a lawful act, 
there is no legal principle on which a claim may be pre-
sented for the damage which the neutral has rather 
caused himself by intrusting his 1nerchandise to a ship 
exposed to danger. Therefore, the war measure being 
lawful, there is no legal ground on which a claim for 
damages 1nay be based in case the merchandise is lost 
because the 'var operation directed against the ship 'vas, 
according to the circun1stances, necesssarily directed 
against her cargo as 'veiL 
The legal question that is important in this 1natter may 
arise even in the course of 'varfnre on land. Conditions 
may be such and very frequently 'vill be found to be 
such that, for instance, while bo1nbarding a fortified or 
defended place, the property of neutrals is damaged. 
But even in warfare on land where priva.te property is 
protected to a greater extent than in naval "rarfare, there 
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is no question of a duty on the part of the belligerent 
State, in such cases, to make compensation even to neu-
trals (art. 3 of the fourth convention of the Second 
Hague Conference). 
Compare Geffcken in Heffter, Volkerrecht, 8th edition, §150, note l 
(incorrect, at least inadequate in that text of Heffter). 
Calvo, Droit International, 4th edition, Vol. IV, §§ 2250-2252. 
Bonfils, Droits des gens, 1908, § 1217. 
Bordwell, Law of War, 1908, p. 212. 
As regards the conditions of naval warfare in partie- P~r;.laration or 
ular there is no protection either general or specific afford-
ed to neutral merchandise by article 3 of the Paris declara-· 
tion against the acts of the belligerent party resulting 
from the circumstances of the war. Article 3 referred 
to above is intended to afford protection against the prize 
la.w to which, up to the time of the Paris declaration, neut-
ral merchandise in theenemyship was exposed. Whatever 
the circumstances of the war demand, 1nust be permitted 
to take place without rega.rd to the fact that neutral mer-
chandise is on board the ship. If, according to article 
2 of the Paris declaration, the neutral flag protects enemy 
merchandise, this does not mean that vice versa the en-
emy ship is to be protected by neutral merchandise, pro-
tected in the first place, perhaps only against destruction, 
but by the same token in innumerable cases against any 
exercise of the prize law. 
As far as can be ascertained, no one has disputed this 
even down to the most recent times . 
. 
Compare Resolutions of the French Conseil d'Etat, May 21, 1872. 
Dalloz, Jurisprudence generale, 1871, III, No. 94, in the prize matter 
Ludwig and Vorwiirts. 
Dupuis, Le Droit de laguerre maritime, 1899, p. 334. 
de Boeck, De la propriete ennemie privee sous pavillion ennemi, 
1882, §146. 
Bordwell, Law of War, 1908, p. 226. 
Wheaton, International Law, 4th edition, p. 507, §359. 
Oppenheim, International Law, second edition, Vol. II, p. 201 ff. 
Calvo, Droit International, 4th edition, Vol. V, §§3033, 3034. 
Hall, International Law, 5th edition, p. 717 ff. 
The assertion of the plaintiffs that the decision of the Frtendch. priz e 
cour eCisions. 
French prize court in the matter of the Ludwig and the 
Vorwiirts had been almost unanimously attacked in the 
literature, has, apart from the quotations adduced from 
the most recent sources (Wehberg and Schramm; the 
quotation from Hall, p. 187, see above, is incomprehen-
sible), not been supported by documents, and must, 
36 INTERNATIONAL LA vV: DECISIONS AND :NOTES. 
therefore, be regarded as incorrect. Only in the most 
recent times, especially in Germany, has there arisen 
a conception of the theory \vhich postulates the obli-
gation to 1nake compensation as a basic principle in all 
cases of the destruction of 1nerchandise not subject to 
seizure generally or only in so far as neutral merchan-
dise is concerned. 
Compare, Schramm, Prisenrecht, 1913, p. 338 ff. 
\Vehberg, Seekriegerecht, 1915, p. 297, notes 3 and 4; and Oesterr. 
Zeitschrift fur offentliches Recht., cited elsewhere. 
Rehm, Deutsche Juristenzeitung, 1915, p. 454. 
In all these sources the general obligation for making 
co1npensation in the above sense is unmistakably felt 
to be something to be taken for granted. 'fhe founda-
tion is lacking and \vhere it is subsequently sought to 
establish one, it does not appear convincing when com-
pared with the explanations given above. Nor can 
anything be done against the conclusiveness of the latter 
expositions by pointing out that warfare on land re1nains 
locally circumscribed to the national territory of the 
belligerents, while the ship sails the open seas. '_rhe 
fact that an enemy ship on the high seas is subject to 
seizure, and, if necessary, to attack, rests on the condi-
tion of international law as it exists, a condition which 
is to be deplored, but which is, nevertheless, a condition 
of fact. In all other respects, so soon as the ship is on 
the high seas, she is a part of the territory of her State, 
in which the neutral, by a voluntary act on his part, 
has placed his rnerchandise, by lading it on a vessel 
of a belligerent country for the purpose of transpor-
tation across the sea. 
German prize I 1 · · 1 ld b d 1 · · regulations. n cone us1on, 1t snou e state . t 1at It IS not a 
defect of procedure \vhen, as is stated in the appeal, 
the prize court has refrained fron1 deciding as to \vhether 
or not the merchandise, to which the claims refer, was 
subject to seizure. It is the object of section 1 of the 
prize. court regulations clearly to define the prize juris-
diction, and even although in section 2 it is prescribed 
to 'vhat the decision is to extend, this n1eans that thereby 
a line has been dra\vn to which the courts 1nust confine 
themselves; but nowhere is it prescribed that in any 
particular case a decision n1ust be handed down 'vith 
regard to the said questions even when the settlernent of 
the claims presented docs not depend thereon. 
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Notwithstanding the summons issued under 9 and 12, 
the plaintiffs have not deposited the amount necessary 
to cover expenses. Their legal remedy was, therefore, 
not to be dealt Tl'vith. 
THE "DACIA" 
1:apeur capture en mer le 2'7 fevrier .1915 par le croiseur nuxil?:aire Europe. 20 
CONSEIL DES PRISES. 
Decision des 3 et 5 aout 1915. 
[HH6J Decisions du Conseil des Prises, 180. 
Au NOM nu PEUPLE FRANQAis, 
Le Conseil des Prises a rendu la decision suivante, entre: 
D'une part, Edward Brei tung, domicilie a Marquette 
(Michigan, Etats-Unis), se disant proprietaire du vapeur 
Dacia, capture en merle 27 fevrier 1915, a l'entree de la 
~Ianche, par le croiseur auxiliaire fran9ais Europe, 
ensemble le capitaine dudit vapeur, et le Ministre de la 
Marine agissant pour le compte des capteurs et de la 
Caisse des Invalides de la Marine. 
D'aU:tre part, vu les lettres et bordereaux du 1finistre 
de la Marine des 30 mars, 29 avril, 15 juillet et 26 juillet 
1915, enregistres au Conseil les 29 avril, 16 et 29 juillet 
1915, portant envoi du dossier concernant la capture du 
vapeur Dacia et concluant a ce qu'il plaise au Conseil 
declarer bonne et valable la capture du Dacia et de tous 
ses accessoires, parmi lesquels les approvisionnements de 
bord de toute nature, y compris les vivres sans exception, 
trouves sur le navire, merne ceux reclames con1me 
propriete personnelle par le capitaine MacDonald, en 
dehors des papier.s de bord; 
Vu les documents constituant ledit dossier, et notanl-
ment: 
1 o Le proces-verbal de capture dresse en mer le 27 
fevrier 1915; 
2° Les papiers de bord, parmi lesquels un acte en date 
a New-York du 17 decembre 1914, par lequel la Com-
pagnie I-Ianiburg-.A.merika declare vendre le Dacia a 
Edward N. Breitung, et un affidavit du 19 decembre 1914 
dudit Breitung declarant cette vente sincere et sans 
reticences; l'acte d'enregistrement americain dudit Dacia 
a Port-Arthur (Texas), le 4 janvier 1915; le manifeste de 
:9 Decision inseree dans le Journal officiel du 28 septembre 1915. 
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